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Abstract: The performance of commercial banks and government-owned specialized 
banks in Thailand are estimated after the 1997 East Asian Financial crisis. Commercial 
banks exhibit increasing returns to scale whereas government owned specialized banks 
exhibit decreasing returns to scale, implying further increases in bank size and market 
concentration in the commercial bank sector but not for government specialized banks. 
Cost inefficiency varies by bank and is a function of the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans, equity to total assets, and liquid assets to total assets, as well as the number of 
branches. On average, banks with fewer non-performing loans, well capitalized, and with 
adequate liquidity are efficient. Thus stricter rules to regulate credit risk management, 
and ensure capital and liquidity adequacy would enhance efficiency in the banking sector. 
Although estimated input substitutability appears to be low, labor and loanable funds are 
substitutes, labor and physical capital as well as physical capital and loanable funds are 
complements in commercial banks. All three inputs of labor, physical capital and 
loanable funds are substitutes for the government specialized banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Thailand requested financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
during the 1997 East Asian Economic Crisis and received a rescue package of 20.3 
billion US dollars conditional on programs of internal economic stabilization and 
financial sector restructuring. The financial restructuring initially focused on the 
identification and closure of non-viable financial institutions, intervention in weak banks, 
and recapitalization of the banking system. As a consequence of these reforms, there were 
significance changes in the ownership structure of financial institutions. The government 
nationalized and liquidated a number of distressed banks. It also abolished the restriction 
on foreign ownership of commercial banks, which had been restricted to less than 25% of 
the equity capital, to attract foreign banks and investors to recapitalize the distressed 
banks. Before the crisis, founding families were the largest shareholders in 5 of the 
largest 8 banks; however, by 2003, foreign investors were the largest shareholders in two 
banks including the largest bank. Two other banks had been either nationalized or 
liquidated.  These activities certainly affected the structure and efficiency of Thai banks. 
After the IMF mandates the Thai government further announced the Financial 
Sector Master Plan in January 2004. The substantial part of this plan included measures 
to increase efficiency of the financial sector by enhancing market mechanisms. These 
included easing entry into the banking sector by promoting the conversion of finance 
companies to commercial banks, relaxing regulations on new branches in densely 
populated areas, and relaxing restrictions on foreign financial institutions’ scope of 
business and number of branches allowed. These changes may have further lead to the 
intensification of competition within the industry and impacted efficiency.  
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Thailand’s banks are currently fully recovered and reformed and continue to play 
important roles in the Thai economy. In 2005, over 6 trillion baht (approximately 180 
billion USD) of total deposits or deposit equivalents were in the banking sector, 
accounting approximately for 76 percent of total deposits or deposits equivalent in all 
Thailand’s financial institutions. This amount is roughly 88 percent of GDP in 2005. 
Moreover, as the most prevalent source of credit in the economy, banks provide lending 
of approximately 5.5 trillion baht, roughly 77 percent of total credit provided by all of 
Thailand’s financial institutions.  
Because of the continued importance of banks in the Thai economy it would be 
informative and beneficial to measure bank performance over this financial adjustment 
period to determine productivity and efficiency changes. Also, knowledge of scale 
economies and the extent of substitutability of bank inputs would permit determining 
structural changes and the extent that banks can adjust to price changes. These results 
would provide insights into the future structure of the banking industry in Thailand. 
Policy from these empirical results could be pursued to encourage good practices and 
discourage bad practices to enhance performance. Further bank sector changes if 
warranted could benefit not only the banking industry but also the entire economy. 
Although the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has also been used to estimate 
bank efficiency (Casu and Molyneux, 2003), we estimate a stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) function and use the parameter estimates to obtain measures of efficiency, 
productivity, input substitutability, and economies of scale, which collectively define 
bank performance. 
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The rest of this article is organized as follows; Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review focused on financial institutions, Section 3 concentrates on a description of the 
methodology, empirical specification and data, Section 4 and 5 provide results and 
conclusions, respectively. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There have been numerous bank efficiency estimates for various countries in the 
world and many of those are summarized in Berger and Humphrey (1997). One of the 
earliest Thailand bank efficiency study was done by Leightner and Lovell (1998), who 
analyzed the impact of financial liberalization on the performance of Thai banks during 
1989-1994, and reported that the average bank in Thailand experienced relatively rapid 
growth in total factor productivity. Subsequently, Kwan (2003) examined the banking 
industries’ operating costs in seven Asian economies including Thailand from 1992 to 
1999, and concluded that bank operating efficiency appeared to be unrelated to the degree 
of openness of the banking sector.  
Chansarn (2005) investigated the Thai financial sector after the 1997 financial 
crisis by looking at total factor productivity (TFP) growth, and found that efficiency in 
the commercial bank sector diminished as did the efficiency of the finance and securities 
company sector. Chantapong and Menkhoff (2005) also studied the effect of foreign bank 
entry on banking efficiency in Thailand after the financial crisis in 1997 and found that 
the cost efficiency of domestic banks improved, resulting from an increase in competition 
arising from the foreign bank entry through acquisition. Rangkakulnuwat (2007) utilized 
an output distance function approach to estimate the technical efficiency of seven Thai 
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commercial banks from 1980 to 2005 who survived the 1997 crisis. The author found that 
the financial liberalization plan between 1987 and 1997, as well as the economics and 
financial reform programs financially supported by IMF, lead to improved efficiency of 
Thai commercial banks.  
Recently, Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran (2009) employed an approach integrating 
Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis to measure the impact of 
restructuring and country-specific factors on bank efficiency in East Asian including 
Thailand from 1997 to 2001. The results indicated that although domestic mergers 
produced more efficient banks, overall, restructuring did not lead to a more efficient 
banking system. Banking system inefficiencies were mostly attributed to country-specific 
conditions, particularly high interest rates, concentrated markets and economic 
development. Chunhachinda (2010) also measured Thai commercial bank efficiency 
between 1990 and 2008 by estimating both parametric and non-parametric cost frontiers. 
Results revealed that average cost efficiency levels of the post-1997 crisis were 
significantly lower than from the pre-crisis period. The emphasis on all of these studies 
were on productivity and efficiency, but none of the authors report the characteristics of 
the frontier function, which is unfortunate because economies of scale and knowledge of 
input substitutability would be useful to determine production changes from prices 
changes.  
Despite the huge popularity of the conventional translog cost frontier, recent 
papers have adopted more flexible functional forms such as the Fourier to estimate cost 
efficiency of banks. Girardone, Molyneux and Gardener (2004) estimated a Fourier cost 
frontier for Italian banks. They found that the average bank-inefficiency levels ranged 
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between 13% and 15% of total cost, which trended to decrease over time. Scale 
economies appeared to be present in the Italian bank industry. 
This paper fills gaps in the research on Thai-bank efficiency. The use of the 
Fourier flexible functional form is more flexible than the conventional translog form and 
thus conceptually more able to fit the data and produce more accurate estimates. Another 
contribution is to compare banking production costs among different bank types in 
Thailand -- the commercial banks and the government-owned specialized banks. 
Elasticities from the cost frontier are also calculated, which are typically absent in past 
efficiency studies.  Finally, more recent years are added to a longitudinal data set 
allowing a discussion of the most recent performance. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
A stochastic cost frontier with fourier components is estimated and the coefficients are 
used to derive returns to scale, efficiency, productivity, and input demand elasticities. The 
fourier (FF) functional form embedded into the translog is a global approximation whose 
performance has been shown to dominate the local-approximation of the translog 
functional form alone (Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001).  The global 
property is important in banking where scale, product mix and other inefficiencies are 
often heterogeneous. The FF is specified as: 
lnTC  0 1ln lni i l l
i l
Q P t T       
  22
1 ln ln ln ln
2 ij i j lm l mi j l m
Q Q P P t T         
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where TC  is observed total cost of production, iQ  is a vector of outputs, iP  is an input-
price vector,  iy  is the adjusted values of the log output, ln iQ , such that they span the 
interval  0,2 , T is the time trend, and u  is assumed to be distributed as half normal, 
 2, uu N  ? , capturing the effects of inefficiency when   is defined as 
 0i ji j
j
Z           (2) 
where jiZ  is the j
th inefficiency determinant of bank ith. The cost frontier model, equation 
(1), and the inefficiency model, equation (2), are estimated simultaneously via a 
maximum likelihood procedure. 
The data must be scaled because a Fourier series approximation near a point of 
discontinuity can oscillate wildly. To avoid this problem, as recommended by Kauko 
(2009), the output data were rescaled as: 
      1.8 min max min 0.1i i i i iy Q Q Q Q             (3) 
Like Berger, Leusner and Mingo (1994), the Fourier terms are applied only to the 
outputs, leaving the input price effects to be defined entirely by the translog terms. The 
primary goal is for a limited number of Fourier terms to describe the scale and 
inefficiency measures associated with differences in bank size. Moreover, the usual input 
price homogeneity restrictions can be imposed on logarithmic price terms, whereas they 
cannot be easily imposed on the trigonometric terms. 
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Since the duality theorem requires that the cost function be linearly homogeneous 
in input prices and that second-order parameters be symmetric, the following restrictions 
are applied to the parameters of the cost function: 
 1l
l
  ;  0lm
l
  ; 0im
i
  ; ij ji  ; lm ml   
Within sample scale economies are calculated and evaluated at the mean output, 
input price and financial capital levels.2 A measure of economies of scale (SE) is given by 
the following cost elasticity by differentiating the cost frontier, equation (2), with respect 
to output, producing equation 4. 
ln ln ln
ln i ij j im mi i i j i mi
TCSE Q P
Q
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The price responsiveness of inputs can be measured by estimating the price elasticity of 
conditional demands (ηij) using the following formulas: 
 ii i iiS  , ij j ijS       (5) 
 
 2
1ii i i
ii
i
S S
S
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i j
S S
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     (6) 
where σij is the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution and Si is the cost share of input 
ith.  
                                                 
2 It is common to evaluate the elasticity at the geometric mean, 
1
1
n n
i
i
a a

     . 
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A time trend variable, T, is incorporated into the cost function to capture the 
disembodied technological change which allows a bank to produce a given level of 
output, Q, at a lower (or higher) cost over time, holding input prices constant (Lang and 
Welzel, 2006). This change can be measured by taking the partial derivative of the 
estimated cost frontier with respect to the time trend variable (T): 
 1 2
ln
c
TCT t t T
T
        (7) 
 
3.2 Data 
The intermediation approach commonly used in bank cost estimates is used to 
model inputs and outputs. Under this approach, the defined inputs of deposits and 
acquired funds, labor, and capital are employed in the production of loans and 
investments. Thai banks can also be classified into two groups: commercial banks and 
government-owned specialized banks, similar to the approach utilized by Mobarek and 
Kalonov (2013) in comparing conventional and Islamic banks. Because these entities are 
different in terms of business structures, management styles and customer bases, they 
may operate under different production technology or different environments, and thus 
are estimated separately after statistically testing verified that they were different. 
The panel nature of the data set provides a large sample size and thus allows 
analyzing productivity growth as well as ranking efficiency among banks. Panel data for 
13 commercial banks were collected from their quarterly financial reports to the stock 
exchange of Thailand, beginning from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 
2010, while data from 5 government-owned specialized banks were collected from their 
financial reports to the ministry of finance. One government specialized bank, the Islamic 
12 
 
bank, is excluded from the data set because it has been newly established, with an 
insufficient number of observations available. The panel data for government-owned 
specialized banks are unbalanced because unlike the commercial banks,  only recently 
beginning in 2003 were they required by law to provide the ministry of finance quarterly  
balance sheet and income statements.  
In order to estimate the cost frontier, the following variables were constructed. Total 
cost  TC  is composed of interest expense, non-interest expense on personnel, and non-
interest expense on premises and equipment. Loan  1Q consists of quantity of loans, 
inter-bank and money market items. Investment  2Q is comprised of government and 
state enterprise securities, and other securities. Unit price of labor  1P  is obtained from 
non-interest expense on personnel divided by the number of employees3. Unit price of 
physical capital  2P  is computed from expenses on buildings and equipment divided by 
their book value4. Unit price of deposits and acquired funds  3P is calculated by dividing 
interest expense by the sum of amount of deposits, short term and long term borrowing, 
bonds and other borrowed money. All items were adjusted to real values (year base 
1988). 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the output quantities and input prices, 
separately for commercial and government banks. On average, commercial banks’ total 
cost, loans, and investments are twice the size of government banks. However, prices of 
                                                 
3 The number of employees is reported at the end of each year only and is assumed to be constant 
throughout any year. 
4 The original cost less depreciation and amortization. 
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inputs paid by commercial banks are slightly less than those of government banks, except 
for wages and salary. 
Table 1 
Variables defining management and the operating environment are assumed to 
determine inefficiency. Dummy variables are used to represent ownership and 
governance; TAKEOVER = 1 if a bank is taken over by foreign investors, zero 
otherwise. Foreign investors may have superior managerial quality, tacit knowledge and 
informational advantage, allowing them to outperform local bankers. In addition, STATE 
= 1 if a major shareholder of a bank is the government. According to incentive theory, 
state-owned banks may suffer from lack of ownership incentives and hence may be prone 
to poor performance. Banks owned by private stockholders might also face stronger 
incentives to control cost and be more efficiency than state-owned banks. 
Several other factors that may impinge on efficiency are added to the model. First, 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is used to control for differences in banks’ 
loan quality. Under the “bad management hypothesis” of Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
loan quality is an indicative of the quality of bank management.  
Also, according to Fillipaki, Margaritis and Staikouras (2009), the number of 
branches of each bank should be included because the major reason banks may open up 
new branches is for efficient utilization of excess capacities. Banks may also have a 
strategic motivation to expand their branch network to defend market share. In this case, 
opening up new branches is not expected to increase banks’ efficiency.  
The ratio of equity to total assets is reflective of capital adequacy of a bank and is 
included in the inefficiency analysis as suggested by Altunbas, Lui, Molyneux and Seth 
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(2000). Well-capitalized banks are perceived to be relatively safe, which in turn lowers 
the cost of borrowing, and consequently enhances efficiency. Therefore, higher levels of 
capital adequacy are expected to impinge positively on efficiency. 
Fillipaki, Margaritis and Staikouras (2009) state that the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets, accounting for different risk preference and risk management practices, 
should be incorporated into the specification of the inefficiency model because it directly 
affects cost efficiency by providing an alternative to deposits as a funding source for 
loans; it may also reflect the risk-return trade-off that banks face. 
Summarily, the determinant of Thai commercial banks’ inefficiency, equation (2), 
is written in the specific form as: 
 0 1 2 3 4TAKEOVER STATE NPL LOAN BRANCHi i i ii           
   5 6EQUITY ASSET LIQUID ASSETi i     (8) 
where TAKEOVER i  is a binary variable taking value of 1 in subsequent years if the i
th  
bank is taken over or acquired by foreign investors. STATEi  is a binary variable to 
distinguish between private banks and state banks,  NPL LOAN i  is the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans, BRANCHi  is the number of branches. 
 EQUITY ASSET i  is the ratio of share-holder equity to total assets, 
and  LIQUID ASSET i  is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 
The inefficiency model for government banks is specified differently. The dummy 
variables for takeover and a state bank are null sets because no government bank has been 
taken over and all are also 100-percent owned by the Thai government. Additionally, the 
variable  NPL LOAN i  is dropped due to incomplete data on the amount of non-
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performing loans. Hence, the three remaining variables determining inefficiency for the 
government banks are the number of branches, the ratio of shareholder equity to total 
assets, and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. The means and standard deviations of 
these variables are summarized in table 2. 
Table 2 
4. Estimation results 
A common frontier for both commercial banks and government banks was first 
estimated and tested to determine if separate frontiers were justified based upon the 
distribution of the efficiency scores.   A number of parametric and non-parametric tests 
based upon the distribution of efficiency scores as specified by Havrylchyk (2006) were 
performed to test whether commercial and government banks come from the same 
population frontier. These tests all rejected the null of a common frontier5.  
These tests have limitations because they test against the null hypothesis whether 
the efficiency distributions are similar rather than directly testing whether the underlying 
technologies are different. To extend these tests, we performed these tests again on the 
predicted total cost expenditure rather than simply the efficiency scores. These test results 
reaffirms the statistical conclusions that the frontiers are different. Therefore, we 
conclude that commercial banks and government banks operate under different 
technologies and it is appropriate and necessary to estimate separate cost frontiers. These 
separate frontier estimates are reported in tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
Table 3 
Table 4 
                                                 
5 These tests are available from the authors and comprised of various nonparametric tests to determine if the 
cost efficiency distributions were different between commercial and government banks 
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Using the estimated coefficients of the cost frontiers reported in tables 3 and 4, the 
scale economies of commercial banks and government banks at geometric means of 
outputs and factor prices are calculated to be 0.92 and 1.73, respectively, implying 
commercial banks experience economies of scale while government banks experience 
diseconomies of scale. From the summary statistics given in table 1, it is clear that 
government banks are much smaller than private commercial banks, and this smaller size 
may be a reflection of diseconomies. This has implications for bank structure in Thailand. 
The commercial bank sector will be expected to increase their market share but not the 
specialized government bank sector unless additional government banks are formed. The 
commercial bank sector is likely to become a more concentrated market, resulting in 
intensified market power of larger banks and higher interest-rate spreads, which would be 
detrimental to customers unless the government closely monitors and regulates the 
market. 
Allen-Uzawa substitutions as defined in equation (6) are computed and used to 
derive price elasticities at the geometric means of input prices as defined in equation (5). 
Tables 5 and 6 present the own and cross price input demand elasticities experienced by 
commercial banks and government banks, respectively. 
Table 5 
Table 6 
For commercial banks, every own price elasticity is negative as expected, with the 
own price elasticity of labor demand being close to negative unity. The implication is that 
expenditures on labor will remain fairly constant as wage rates change. The own price 
elasticity of demand for physical capital is substantially greater than negative one 
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implying that physical capital is very sensitive to the price of capital. Demand for 
loanable funds is inelastic with close to a zero own price elasticity. This is not surprising 
given that banks require funds to write loans and thus demand is not sensitive to price. 
Labor and loanable funds are weak substitutes, whereas labor and physical capital, and 
physical capital and loanable funds are weak complements, with all cross price elasticities 
being very close to zero. So although capital is negatively responsive to capital price, 
there would be little substitution of labor for capital given that labor and physical capital 
are weak complements This set of elasticities of substitution  implies a fixed proportion 
technology, meaning that it would be difficult for commercial banks to substitute inputs 
in response to input prices changes.  
For government banks, own and cross price elasticities shown in table 6 are very 
similar to those of commercial banks; all input demands have negative slopes with own-
price elasticity of demand for labor close to unity. The demand for physical capital is 
highly elastic but demand for loanable funds is inelastic. 
Estimates of technical change are derived using equation (7) and are summarized 
in figure 1. For commercial banks, technical change resulted in a decline in the cost of 
production throughout the period of study, but these cost declines occurred at a slower 
rate as time passes, from 0.53% in the first quarter of 1998 to only 0.02% in the fourth 
quarter of 2010. On the other hand, government banks suffered from an increase in cost 
of production, but the rate of this rising trend decreased over time, from 0.63% in the first 
quarter of 1998 to 0.49% in the fourth quarter of 2010. Therefore, commercial banks 
experienced cost decreases over this time period but those cost decreases appear to have 
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been mostly captured. In contrast the government banks experienced cost increases over 
time.  
Figure 1 
Table 7 presents the average cost-inefficiency score for each commercial bank 
together with the average of the inefficiency-determinant variables, while the 
determinants of cost inefficiency are reported towards the end of table 3. The ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans (NPL/LOAN), and whether a bank was taken over 
during the financial crisis (TAKEOVER), have positive effects on cost inefficiency, 
whereas other variables, including the dummy variable representing the state-enterprise 
bank (STATE), the ratio of equity to total assets (EQUITY/ASSET), the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets (LIQUID/ASSET), and the number of branches (BRANCH) have 
negative impacts on cost inefficiency.  
Table 7 
 
 The fact that the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is positively related 
to cost inefficiency broadly supports the bad management hypothesis of Berger and 
DeYoung (1997), which suggests that efficient banks tend to perform better because they 
are better in evaluating credit risks. That the equity-to-total-asset ratio has a negative 
relationship with cost inefficiency suggests that a better capitalized bank tends to be more 
cost efficient than a bank highly leveraged, perhaps because ownership incentives induce 
higher quality cost management. In addition, the coefficient on the ratio of liquid-asset-
to-total-asset is negative, suggesting banks that can retain large amounts of liquid assets 
are likely to be successful in lowering their financial risks and hence tend to perform 
more efficiently. Hence, policies to regulate banks’ credit risk management, capital 
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adequacy and liquidity, are beneficial for enhancing cost efficiency. Thus the bank of 
Thailand may consider increasing the required allowance for doubtful accounts6 and 
liquidity retention7. Furthermore, the fact that the number of branches has a negative 
impact on bank inefficiency is consistent with the presumption that banks are likely to 
open up new branches for efficient utilization of excess capacities. Relaxing the rules to 
establish new branches might provide further incentives for banks.  
 Surprisingly, the coefficient on the dummy variable representing state-enterprise 
banks is negative, suggesting that state-enterprise banks trend to outperform private-
owned banks. This fact seems to contradict the presumption that state ownership is 
associated with poor economic performance. Banks are categorized as state-enterprises if 
the Thai government holds more than 50% of their shareholder equity. According to this 
definition, only one bank, Krung Thai Bank, is labeled as a state-enterprise bank, which 
limits the inference, but with 52 quarterly observations, it appears that the result is 
consistent over time. Other banks like Siam City Bank and Bank Thai, are not classified 
as state enterprises even though their major shareholder is the Financial Institution 
Development Fund (FIDF) because those banks are independently managed by the board 
appointed by the government. The Thai Military Bank is not considered a state enterprise 
because the government is only a significant shareholder at 26% of the stock. After the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, by the prescription of the government, Krung Thai Bank 
merged with smaller insolvent banks. Moreover, Krung Thai Bank was better-capitalized 
than other banks during the period of the crisis because of government financial support. 
                                                 
6 Currently, the bank of Thailand sets the requirements of capital adequacy ratio and allowance for doubtful 
accounts according to the Basel II accord, International Accounting Standards (IAS 39) and Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). 
7 Presently, according to the bank of Thailand’s rules, commercial banks are required to retain at least 6% 
of liquid assets to total deposits. 
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The government provided the bank with low-cost funding to stimulate the slowed 
economy. This might be why Krung Thai Bank was more efficient than private-owned 
banks. 
The coefficient on the dummy variable representing banks which are acquired by 
foreign banks has a positive sign, opposite of findings by Kasman and Yildirim (2006) of 
banks in the new EU countries during transition. The banks that were acquired or 
majority owned by foreign investors include Bank Thai8, United Overseas Bank9, and 
Standard Chartered Nakornthon10. The reason why foreigner-owned banks show lower 
efficiency than domestically owned banks might be that although foreign banks may have 
superior management skill and culture, they might have less knowledge about the local 
market and success in meeting the needs of that market. 
The Krung Thai Bank appears to be the most efficient bank whose average cost-
inefficiency score is the lowest at 1.008. Since cost-inefficiency score represents how 
much firms could reduce costs if they had produced on the cost frontier, this implies that 
on average Krung Thai Bank produces output at only a 0.8% higher cost relative to the 
cost frontier. Figure 2 illustrates the plots of cost-inefficiency scores of the four most 
efficient banks including Krung Thai Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, Bangkok Bank, and 
Kasikorn Thai Bank. These findings are very similar to previous studies; for example, 
Rangkakulnuwat (2007) found that Krung Thai Bank was the most efficient bank; 
Chansarn (2008) found the average efficiency of Siam Commercial Bank and Kasikorn 
Bank was equal to one throughout the period (2003-2006) while Krung Thai Bank was 
the most efficient bank in the years 2004 to 2006. It is also noteworthy that these four 
                                                 
8 On November 5, 2008 Bank Thai was acquired by Malaysian CIMB group.  
9 UOB bank was initially Ratanasin Bank. It was acquired by Singaporean United Overseas Banks in 1998. 
10 In 1999, Singaporean Standard Chartered bank acquired 75% of the shares of Nakornthon Bank. 
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banks have been consistently labeled the Big 4 banks in Thailand for many years because 
of their enormous assets and market share11. Figure 2, shows the vast gaps between the 
most efficient bank and the other 3 banks during the early period of the study, but these 
gaps trend to disappear as time passes, implying that the less efficient banks are catching 
up with the most efficient bank. 
Figure 2 
The efficiency of government-owned specialized banks can be derived from the 
cost-frontier estimation results in table 4. Table 8 reports the means and standard 
deviations of cost inefficiency together with the inefficiency-explanatory variables of 
each government-owned specialized bank. 
Table 8 
 The equity-to-total-asset ratio has a negative effect on cost inefficiency, the same 
result was found for commercial banks. However, an increase in the liquid-asset-to-total-
asset ratio will increase cost inefficiency. This implies that government banks face the 
financial constraint of the tradeoff between retaining liquid assets and holding less-liquid 
and higher-risk assets; they must choose between liquid assets which improve their cost 
efficiency but provides only little return, or less liquid assets which gives higher returns 
but potentially lower cost efficiency. Government banks’ branch expansion appears to 
have resulted in higher inefficiency.  
The Export-Import Bank of Thailand is the most efficient government bank 
throughout the period, which is due to few branches and a high equity-to-total-asset ratio. 
                                                 
11 Chansarn (2008), for example, categorizes Thai commercial banks into 3 groups: large banks consisting 
of Bangkok Bank, Kasikorn Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, and Krung Thai Bank: medium bank consisting 
of Bank of Ayudhaya, Thai Military Bank, Siam City Bank, Bank Thai, and Thanacart Bank: small banks 
consisting of Standard Charter Nakornthon Bank, TISCO Bank, and Kaitnakin Bank.  
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On the other hand, the Bank of Agriculture and Cooperatives shows a low although 
upward trend in efficiency over time. This lower efficiency might be attributed to low 
equity and an enormous number of branches (861 branches on average over the period). 
The government encourages the Bank of Agriculture and Cooperatives to establish 
branches in many districts throughout the country in order to facilitate farmer’s broad 
accessibility to loans, but this accessibility comes at a cost to that bank. The time trends 
of government bank’s efficiencies are much different from those of commercial banks 
and are unsystematic; only Export-Import Bank of Thailand is consistently ranked as the 
most efficient bank throughout the period. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The objective of this paper was to estimate the performance of individual banks in 
the Thailand banking industry. That information can help guide policy to induce 
continued improved performance of the banking sector. To accomplish this objective, 
separate cost efficiencies for Thai commercial banks and government-owned specialized 
banks were estimated using quarterly data from 1998 through 2010 employing a Fourier-
specified stochastic cost function. Determinants of cost inefficiency are included in the 
specification and estimations. The hypothesis that both commercial banks and 
government banks data are drawn from the same population is rejected; therefore, the 
cost frontiers for commercial banks and government banks were estimated separately. 
In the very first years after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, there were wide 
gaps between the most and least efficient banks. However, these gaps among the group of 
big banks disappeared in recent years, although the small banks failed to catch up to the 
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big banks. This has implications for the ability of small banks to survive. In addition, 
Thai commercial banks’ production technology exhibits increasing returns to scale at 
their current size. Hence, the results suggest that additional growth in bank size, more 
concentrated market and intensified market power of big banks are plausible. Unless the 
government monitors and regulates the market, consumers might suffer from raising 
interest rate spreads. 
Commercial banks with a lower non-performing loan-to-total-loan ratio, a higher 
equity-to-total-asset ratio, a higher liquid-asset-to-total-asset ratio, and more branches are 
found to be more efficient. Hence, policies to induce strict credit-risk management, to 
discourage leverages and to encourage banks to establish new branches are 
recommended. 
Estimated price elasticities of demands for inputs show that labor and loanable 
funds appear to be substitutes to each other; however, labor and physical capital as well 
as physical capital and loanable funds are complements. There is poor substitutability 
between labor and physical capital implying a fixed proportion technology and an 
inability to substitute capital for labor or vice versa. 
 For government-owned specialized banks the factors increasing cost inefficiency 
were a higher equity-to-total-asset ratio, a lower liquid-asset-to-total-asset ratio, and 
fewer branches. In contrast to commercial banks, government-owned banks seem to 
suffer from diseconomies of scale. In their production of loans and investments, all three 
inputs including labor, physical capital and loanable funds appear to be substitutes for 
each other. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of variables for frontier cost function 
 
C Q1 Q2 P1 P2 P3 
Cost Loans Investments Labor Capital Funds 
Commercial Mean 5,620 466,000 80,500 160,723 0.06 0.01 
Banks Std 5,930 366,000 82,600 222,788 0.04 0.01 
        
Government Mean 3,050 2,590 536 155,191 0.07 0.01 
Banks Std 2,300 1,970 996 52,245 0.06 0.00 
        
Note: cost and output (C, Q1 and Q2) units in million baht; unit of wage and salary (P1) in 
baht per quarters. 
Data are collected from individual banks’ quarterly financial reports. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables explaining banks’ inefficiency 
  NPL/Total loan Branches Equity/ Total assets 
Liquidity/ Total 
assets 
Commercial Mean 0.14 354 0.08 0.12 
Banks Std 0.16 257 0.04 0.12 
      
Government Mean  357 0.10 0.06 
Banks Std  349 0.04 0.06 
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Table 3. The estimated cost frontier for commercial banks 
 
 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic 
Stochastic Cost frontier (equation 3)   
0  constant -47.492*** 13.1838 -3.60 
1  1ln Q  4.94398*** 0.99402 4.97 
2  2ln Q  0.18515 0.33746 0.55 
1  1ln P  -0.9232** 0.37213 -2.48 
2  2ln P  0.54707 0.35509 1.54 
3  3ln P  1.37617*** 0.24601 5.59 
11   211 2 ln Q  -0.0638 0.04847 -1.32 
22   221 2 ln Q  0.11285*** 0.01888 5.98 
12  1 2ln lnQ Q  -0.1122*** 0.01863 -6.02 
11   211 2 ln P  -0.0279** 0.01403 -1.99 
22   221 2 ln P  -0.3606*** 0.03867 -9.32 
33   231 2 ln P  0.09546*** 0.00984 9.70 
12  1 2ln lnP P  -0.0891*** 0.02325 -3.83 
13  1 3ln lnP P  -0.0672*** 0.01353 -4.97 
23  2 3ln lnP P  -0.1063*** 0.01951 -5.45 
11  1 1ln lnQ P  0.02119 0.01856 1.14 
12  1 2ln lnQ P  -0.0383* 0.0204 -1.88 
13  1 3ln lnQ P  0.01715 0.01386 1.24 
21  2 1ln lnQ P  0.01026 0.01777 0.58 
22  2 2ln lnQ P  0.00034 0.01765 0.02 
23  2 3ln lnQ P  -0.0106 0.01018 -1.04 
1t  T -0.0054
*** 0.0019 -2.86 
2t  
2T 0.0001*** 3.2E-05 3.16 
1a   1cos y  -0.0596*** 0.01727 -3.45 
1b   1sin y  -0.144*** 0.03555 -4.05 
2a   2cos y  -0.0164 0.01369 -1.20 
2b   2sin y  0.05799*** 0.01878 3.09 
11a   1 1cos y y  0.02726*** 0.00931 2.93 
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 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic 
12a   1 22cos y y  -0.0248*** 0.00763 -3.25 
22a   2 2cos y y  0.02509** 0.01068 2.35 
11b   1 1sin y y  -0.0236*** 0.01168 -2.02 
12b   1 22sin y y  0.02284*** 0.00668 3.42 
22b   2 2sin y y  0.00819 0.01217 0.67 
 2ln v   -5.7701 0.116595 -49.49 
Inefficiency model (equation 10)   
0  CONSTANT -1.03717*** 0.372453 -2.78 
1  TAKEOVER 1.080186*** 0.431281 2.50 
2  STATE -1.46906*** 0.391788 -3.75 
3  NPL/LOAN 1.279289** 0.653876 1.96 
4  EQUITY/ASSET -14.2237*** 3.300632 -4.31 
5  LIQUID/ASSET -3.23623*** 1.088508 -2.97 
6  BRANCH -0.00847*** 0.000881 -9.62 
u   0.055852 0.003256  
Note: *, **, *** represents statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, levels. 
 The number of observations is 523. 
 The log likelihood is 579.92. 
 The distribution of inefficiency term is assumed to be half normal. 
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Table 4. The estimated cost frontier for government specialized banks 
 
 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic 
Stochastic Cost frontier (equation 3)   
0  constant -85.1997** 39.67668 -2.15 
1  1ln Q  11.28217*** 4.001251 2.82 
2  2ln Q  -0.38396 0.45816 -0.84 
1  1ln P  -1.43976* 0.745476 -1.93 
2  2ln P  2.582125* 1.365805 1.89 
3  3ln P  -0.14236 1.05888 -0.13 
11   211 2 ln Q  -0.68353*** 0.205355 -3.33 
22   221 2 ln Q  0.013633 0.011959 1.14 
12  1 2ln lnQ Q  0.007238 0.016059 0.45 
11   211 2 ln P  -0.1488** 0.059209 -2.51 
22   221 2 ln P  -0.07091 0.06074 -1.17 
33   231 2 ln P  0.217084** 0.090458 2.40 
12  1 2ln lnP P  0.114185 0.094648 1.21 
13  1 3ln lnP P  0.221348** 0.092159 2.4 
23  2 3ln lnP P  0.025615 0.041903 0.61 
11  1 1ln lnQ P  0.222433*** 0.03235 6.88 
12  1 2ln lnQ P  -0.19234*** 0.032216 -5.97 
13  1 3ln lnQ P  -0.03009 0.037071 -0.81 
21  2 1ln lnQ P  0.004259 0.017635 0.24 
22  2 2ln lnQ P  -0.00193 0.022706 -0.09 
23  2 3ln lnQ P  -0.00233 0.02236 -0.10 
1t  T 0.006367 0.010421 0.61 
2t  
2T -2.8E-05 0.000152 -0.19 
1a   1cos y  -0.05257 0.119746 -0.44 
1b   1sin y  -0.31278 0.232779 -1.34 
2a   2cos y  -0.27615** 0.11839 -2.33 
2b   2sin y  -0.4121*** 0.106224 -3.88 
11a   1 1cos y y  -0.06747 0.090338 -0.75 
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 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic 
12a   1 22cos y y  -0.10174 0.063357 -1.61 
22a   2 2cos y y  0.109957 0.0693 1.59 
11b   1 1sin y y  -0.1847** 0.085613 -2.16 
12b   1 22sin y y  -0.18255*** 0.048231 -3.78 
22b   2 2sin y y  -0.04983 0.079832 -0.62 
 2ln v   -5.97734 0.394597 -15.15 
Inefficiency model (equation 10)   
0  CONSTANT -3.55694*** 1.277006 -2.79 
4  EQUITY/ASSET -30.4118 23.9808 -1.27 
5  LIQUID/ASSET 4.311321 4.478098 0.96 
6  BRANCH 0.002009 0.001453 1.38 
u   0.050355 0.009935  
Note: *, **, *** and represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 The number of observations is 134. 
 The log likelihood is 171.69. 
 The distribution of inefficiency term is assumed to be half normal. 
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Table 5. Own and cross price elasticities of demand for inputs of commercial banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Own and cross price elasticities of demand for inputs of government banks 
 
 
in
pu
t i
 
input j 
Own and cross price elasticities of demand for inputs  ij  
 labor physical capital loanable funds 
labor -0.893 -0.003 0.154 
physical capital -0.007 -3.959 -0.108 
loanable funds 0.053 -0.019 -0.199 
in
pu
t i
 
input j 
Own and cross price elasticities of demand for inputs  ij  
 labor physical capital loanable funds 
labor -1.245 0.002 0.619 
physical capital 0.008 -2.071 0.457 
loanable funds 0.266 0.043 -0.013 
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Table 7. Average cost inefficiencies and causation factors for commercial banks 
 
Name Inefficiency 
NPL/ 
Loan 
Equity/ 
assets 
Liquid/ 
Assets Branches 
 
Takeover 
Krung Thai Bank* 1.01 0.17 0.07 0.14 666 no
Siam Commercial Bank 1.02 0.15 0.09 0.11 629 no
Bangkok Bank Limited 1.02 0.19 0.07 0.13 655 no
Kasikorn Bank 1.02 0.13 0.07 0.14 557 no
Siam City Bank 1.04 0.19 0.06 0.09 325 no
Thai Military Bank 1.05 0.17 0.06 0.07 406 no
Bank of Ayudaya 1.06 0.16 0.07 0.09 464 no
Thanachart Bank 1.11 0.03 0.10 0.13 99 no
Bank Thai 1.13 0.19 0.03 0.12 110 yes
Kaitnakin Bank 1.13 0.12 0.18 0.06 28 no
UOB Bank 1.19 0.10 0.09 0.21 85 yes
TISCO Bank 1.19 0.04 0.12 0.04 26 no
Satndard Charter 
Nakornthon Bank 
1.37 0.10 0.07 0.15 47 yes
Mean 1.09 0.13 0.08 0.12 315 -
Std 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.04 249 -
Note: * Only Krung Thai Bank is considered state-enterprise commercial bank because 
over 50% of its equity is hold by the Thai government. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Average cost inefficiencies and causation factors for government banks 
 
Name Inefficiency 
Equity/ 
Assets 
Liquid/ 
Assets 
Number of 
Branches 
Export-Import Bank of 
Thailand 1.02 0.16 0.11 11
Small-and-Medium 
Enterprise Bank 1.04 0.11 0.07 94
Government Saving Bank 1.06 0.10 0.05 595
Government Housing Bank 1.08 0.05 0.03 130
Bank of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 1.12 0.09 0.07 862
Mean 1.06 0.10 0.07 338
Std 0.04 0.04 0.03 332
 Figure 1. Technical change for commercial banks and government banks over the period 1998Q1-2009Q4 
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Figure 2. Cost inefficiency of the four most efficient commercial banks 
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